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The Economics of a Blender’s Tax Credit versus a Tax Exemption: The Case of U.S. 






This paper shows that the effects of the U.S. blender’s tax credit of $1/gallon and ‘splash & 
dash’ had minimal impacts on the EU biodiesel market. Reduced world oil prices and EU tax 
exemptions, increased rapeseed oil prices and market uncertainty are shown empirically to be the 
major contributors to reduced profitability of EU biodiesel production. Nevertheless, the EU 
imposed tariffs sometimes exceeding the tax credit in retaliation for the U.S. ‘splash & dash’ 
program. Instead, EU imports from the United States can be beneficial for EU taxpayers, fuel 
consumers as well as U.S. biodiesel producers.  
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1.  Introduction 
   
Both the United States and the European Union have used biodiesel consumption subsidies. The 
EU subsidy is in the form of a tax exemption at the retail fuel pump (47.04 cents/liter in 
Germany in July of 2006 but is being reduced over time) while the U.S. consumption subsidy 
initiated in 2004 was a blender’s tax credit of $1/gallon. However, the U.S. blender’s tax credit 
was not extended after the end of 2009. Each policy has identical market effects in a closed 
economy: it raises the market price of biodiesel by the amount of the subsidy (de Gorter and Just 
2008; 2009b). However, with international trade, only one country’s policy can establish the 
world price of biodiesel (Kliauga, de Gorter and Just 2008; 2010). Because the EU tax 
exemption is higher than the U.S. tax credit, the world biodiesel price is set by market 
parameters in the European Union.
1 This paper shows how the EU biodiesel price is determined, 
including its link to world oil prices, and how it is affected by a tax exemption for biodiesel and a 
differential fuel tax on diesel versus gasoline. In this situation, the U.S. biodiesel price is equal to 
the EU price less transportation costs (Figure 1). This means the U.S. blender’s tax credit acts 
instead as a biodiesel production subsidy.
2 If the reverse was true and the world market price was 
established by the U.S. tax credit, then the EU tax exemption would subsidize fuel (diesel and 
biodiesel) consumption instead and would not benefit EU biodiesel producers directly.
3 
 
Because of rising oil prices, a high fuel tax exemption for biodiesel and modest rapeseed oil 
prices, EU biodiesel production capacity skyrocketed from 2004 to 2008 but actual production 
stagnated at about half of capacity after 2007 (see Figure 2 for Germany).
4,5  Meanwhile, imports 
from the United States increased substantially (Figure 3) as each gallon of domestically produced 
or imported biodiesel that was blended with oil-based diesel was eligible for this subsidy 
(regardless of amount - a typical blend was a ‘splash’ of 0.1 percent diesel and 99.9 percent 
biodiesel).
6 The resulting blend was then exported (‘dashed’) to the European Union.
7 
 
As a consequence of declining profitability of EU biodiesel sector (reflected by stagnation in 
production and excess capacity) and soaring imports from the United States, the EU biodiesel 
producers asked the European Commission for an investigation into biodiesel imports from the 
United States. They argued that the U.S. ‘splash & dash’ program “disrupted EU profit margins 
and put most of them [producers] out of business” (Voegele 2008). The European Commission 
(EC) initiated countervailing and antidumping investigation on June 13, 2008. The EC found 
material injury and in March 2009 implemented provisional anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties on biodiesel imports from the United States. The provisional duties were transformed into 
five year duties on July 7, 2009, and the countervailing component is approximately equal to 
about the U.S. blender’s tax credit of $1/gallon (Official Journal of the European Union 2009b).
8  
 
This paper shows that the U.S. ‘splash & dash’ program had a minimal impact on the reduced 
profitability of EU biodiesel producers. The only way U.S. exports could affect the EU biodiesel 
price is twofold: (1) the change in U.S. biodiesel exports due to blender’s tax credit reduces 
world oil prices, or (2) the EU mandate would otherwise be binding and enhanced U.S. exports 
due to a blender’s tax credit increased supplies to EU biodiesel market such that the price 
premium of a mandate was eliminated (or decreased). We show that the effect of additional 
(world) biodiesel production due to ‘splash & dash’ on world oil prices is minimal. In Germany, 
the biodiesel tax exemption was determining the market price until June 2008. In July 2008, the   4
German biodiesel-specific blend mandate of 4.4 percent started to bind because of the reduction 
in the tax exemption and falling diesel prices. Beginning January 2009, the market price of 
biodiesel in Germany is seemingly being established by the ‘overall’ biofuel mandate.  
Although U.S. exports under ‘splash & dash’ plummeted after the tariff, we provide evidence 
that the most important reasons for reduced EU biodiesel production profitability were reduced 
world oil prices and EU tax exemptions, and increasing  price of the feedstock (rapeseed oil). 
Market uncertainty has also negatively affected the production levels. This is confirmed with 
data showing that excess EU biodiesel production capacity is still high, even 19 months after the 
tariff was imposed in March 2009 and with the German tax exemption increasing in October 
2009. 
 
U.S. producers were ‘double-dipping’ as they benefited from both the U.S. blender’s tax credit 
and the high biodiesel price due to EU tax exemption (although EU production was eligible too, 
it faced two-way transportation costs). EU imports surged in the second quarter of 2007. 
Previously, the European Union was by far the biggest producer of biodiesel in the world with 
much higher production capacity relative to other countries. In mid-2007, however, numerous 
biodiesel production plants emerged in the United States, Indonesia and Malaysia. Moreover, 
before October of 2008, both domestic and imported biodiesel was eligible for the U.S. blender’s 
tax credit. The above together with a significant increase in the world oil price in the first half of 
2008 (which translated into an increase in EU biodiesel market prices) contributed to the 
expansion of the ‘splash & dash’ biodiesel trade.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section analyzes the economics of a 
tax exemption and blender’s tax credit in an open economy. In particular, we show how the 
world market price of biodiesel is determined, which country establishes it, and the effects of the 
other countries’ policies. In Section 3, we theoretically model the impact of the ‘splash & dash’ 
on welfare in the European Union and the United States. Section 4 uses empirical data on the 
‘splash & dash’ policy for Germany to illustrate its impacts on biodiesel market price. The final 
section provides some concluding remarks.  
  
2.  The determination of the world market price of biodiesel  
 
In a closed economy, a blender’s tax credit has the same effect as a fuel tax exemption – both 
constitute a biodiesel consumption subsidy that raises the market price of biodiesel and hence 
constitutes an unfair advantage over diesel (oil) production (de Gorter and Just 2008, 2009a). 
Hence, both tax credits and tax exemptions in this situation are by themselves actionable 
subsidies in domestic countervailing duty law or WTO law from the point of view of producers 
of diesel or oil only.  
 
But the situation gets more complicated with international trade. Do both tax exemptions or tax 
credits at the same time increase the market price of biodiesel? Analysis in Kliauga, de Gorter 
and Just (2008; 2010) shows that only one country’s policy and market situation determines the 
world biofuel price. So what factors determine which country establishes the world market price 
of a biofuel? The world market price of biodiesel is either (1) linked to the diesel (oil) price by a 
tax exemption or tax credit in the country with a combination of the highest consumer price paid 
for diesel and the lowest net tax (the combination of the lowest fuel tax and highest biofuel tax   5
exemption/tax credit) (Kliauga, de Gorter and Just 2008; 2010) or (2) is determined by a binding 
mandate if biodiesel price in the country is higher than under the case (1). Consistent with this 
theory, we show below that the world biodiesel prices have been established in the European 




The EU fuel tax exemption for biodiesel 
 
To determine the market price of biodiesel, assume biodiesel and diesel are perfect substitutes. 
Thus the price a consumer is willing to pay for a gallon of biodiesel equals the price of diesel 
adjusted for the lower energy content of biodiesel: 
 
(1)                                                                B D P P γ =  
 
where B P  is the price of biodiesel,  D P is the price of diesel, and γ is a number of miles traveled 
per gallon of biodiesel relative to gallon of diesel ( 0.90 γ ≈ ). 
 
With a fuel excise tax on diesel t, the consumer’s willingness to pay for biodiesel increases by 
less than the amount of the tax because of the lower energy content of biodiesel. It is given by: 
 
(2)                                                              ( ) D P t γ +  
 
In the European Union, a lower excise tax is placed on biodiesel relative to regular diesel (i.e., a 
consumption tax exemption  e t  is provided, and has often been equal to the diesel fuel tax). 
Therefore, the EU fuel blenders earn revenues per liter of biodiesel of: 
 
(3)                                                                B e P t t + −  
 
Market equilibrium is established when: 
 
                                                          ( ) B e D P t t P t γ + − = +  
 
Solving for B P , the biodiesel market price, we obtain: 
 
(4)                                                      (1 ) B D e P P t t γ γ = − − +  
 
Equation (4) identifies four principal determinants of the EU biodiesel price: the world oil 
market price reflected by the diesel market price, miles traveled per gallon of biodiesel relative to 
diesel, the fuel excise tax and the biodiesel tax exemption. Implicitly embedded in (4) is also a 
fifth determinant − indirect subsidization of diesel which results in a higher biodiesel price in 
Europe (by means of a lower volumetric tax relative to gasoline). This happens because in most 
EU countries diesel tax is lower than gasoline tax. It means that if diesel and gasoline were taxed   6
on an energy-content basis (instead of volumetrically, as it is the case now), then the diesel tax 
would increase and by equation (4), the biodiesel market price would decline.
11  
 
Because of the tax exemption, EU fuel blenders are able to pay more for biodiesel. Competing 
blenders of biodiesel and diesel will bid up the price of biodiesel until in theory it is above the 
market price of diesel (according to equation (4)) by the full amount of the tax exemption.  
 
The net subsidy or the effective rate of biodiesel support in the European Union (which U.S. 
producers can equally benefit from) is given by the term (1 ) e t t γ − − + , where the first part is a 
penalty due to volumetric taxation of biodiesel where the lower mileage per gallon of biodiesel 
relative to diesel is not taken into account. For instance, the net subsidy to biodiesel industry in 
Germany decreased stepwise from 0.419 Euro/l in 2005 to 0.220 Euro/l in 2009.  
 
Now assume there are no transportation costs, no blender’s tax credit in the United States and 
that the tax exemption is used only in the European Union. In this situation, the European Union 
benefits from the net subsidy but so do U.S. producers provided it exports biodiesel to the 
European Union.  
 
But what if the opposite was the case: there is no tax exemption in the EU and the U.S. has a 
blender’s tax credit. In this hypothetical situation, the net biodiesel subsidy in the United States 
(calculated using the U.S. fuel tax rates and the blender’s tax credit) ranged from 0.181 to 0.209 
Euro/l between 2005 and 2009.
12 Hence, over most of the time period, the net subsidy to German 
producers was twice as high as in the United States.  
 
In reality, however, the U.S. biodiesel producers could take advantage of both the U.S. and the 
EU net subsidy, but only a little amount of EU biodiesel took advantage of the U.S. subsidy as 
apparently it was not profitable for much of the time period for EU producers to ship biodiesel to 
the United States and then back to Europe 
Mandate 
 
In the empirical section of the paper below, we show that the EU tax exemption was binding 
(and determining the price of biodiesel) up to June 2008. From July 2008, the actual market price 
is above that predicted by equation (4). This suggests the EU mandate was binding and the EU 
tax exemption did not determine biodiesel prices. The recent literature analyzing economic 
impacts of two major biofuel policies – a blender’s tax credit and consumption/blend mandate 
has found that the market price of a biofuel is always determined by only one of them, never 
both (de Gorter and Just, 2007; 2009a,b).
13 For an exposition on how the price of a biofuel is 
determined under a mandate see de Gorter and Just (2007, 2009a) and for an excellent 
application to the French biodiesel mandate and tax exemption see Doumax (2010). With a 
binding mandate in place, prices of biodiesel are delinked from the oil prices and so if imports 
are high enough, they can decrease the price premium, thus affecting price of biodiesel.
14 
Does it matter if the other country has a tax credit vs a tax exemption? 
 
So far we showed that the European Union determined the world biodiesel market price and also 
that the U.S. tax credit by itself would result in a much lower net subsidy and, therefore, a lower   7
price for biofuel. In reality, there is international trade and markets are linked. Many countries 
apply either a tax exemption or tax credit. This poses a question as to what are the effects of tax 
credits or tax exemptions in the countries outside the European Union that do not determine the 
world price. 
 
Either policy (a tax exemption or a tax credit), in the price-determining country is an actionable 
subsidy by itself, from the point of view of oil producers (but not for biofuel producers, as 
biodiesel producers gain worldwide). It is because either the tax exemption or the tax credit 
(depending on which determines the world market price) increases the market price of biodiesel 
and hence its production above a level that would have otherwise existed. Therefore, oil 
production may be crowded out due to these policies.  
 
Assuming a two-country world, the question now becomes whether a tax credit (tax exemption) 
in the other country is also necessarily an actionable subsidy. Not always, as the table below 
summarizes. The reason is that once the world market price of biodiesel is established by one 
country (A), a tax credit or a tax exemption in the other country (B) cannot affect it, but acts as a 
production subsidy in the case of a tax credit and fuel consumption subsidy with a tax 
exemption. Therefore, if country B has a tax credit, then it is an actionable subsidy, but a tax 
exemption is not (oil producers can even benefit from it because as fuel consumption increases 
so does consumption of diesel). Furthermore, if country B has a tax credit (as was the case with 
the United States and the ‘splash & dash’ program), it expands biodiesel exports as a result of 
increased biodiesel production and imports from third countries that are ‘splashed’ and then 
‘dashed’ to country A (the European Union).  
 
 
Is country B’s policy actionable? 
  Country B’s policy  
(receive same biodiesel price established by country A) 
Price established by country A by:  
(policy by itself always actionable for oil 
producers) 
tax credit  tax exemption 
tax exemption     × 
tax credit           × 
Note:  - policy in country B is actionable by oil producers, × - policy in country B is not actionable 
The above table also proves useful if one seeks to determine what the impact of various 
combinations of biofuel policies would be, conditional on which country (and policy in that 
country) determines the biodiesel price. For example, if the United States determined the world 
biodiesel price (country A in this case) through a tax exemption, then the EU tax exemption 
would subsidize fuel consumption and so have little or no effect on U.S. biodiesel prices. On the 
other hand, if the European Union had a tax credit, it would subsidize biodiesel production.  
 
One clear implication is that the entire ‘splash & dash’ controversy would not exist if the 
European Union switched their tax exemption to a blender’s tax credit or the United States 
switched their tax credit to a tax exemption. In this way, no country can ‘double dip’.   8
 
Tax exemptions or tax credits are not additive: the market price of a biofuel is not determined by 
the sum of each country’s tax exemption or credit.
15 The only impact on the biofuel price in 
countries that do not establish the market price of biofuels is indirect insofar as the change in 
biodiesel production or consumption affects world diesel (oil prices) and hence the biodiesel 
market price in the European Union where it is ‘established’.
16 The fact that a combination of the 
consumer diesel price paid, fuel tax and biodiesel tax exemption in the European Union 
established the world market price of biodiesel occurred even though the prices of biodiesel, 
biodiesel feedstock and oil (diesel) are linked to each other within a country and across countries 
through international trade. 
 
Another example of the complexity of a tax credit versus tax exemption is Canada that switched 
its tax exemption to a biofuels producer tax credit in April 2008 (Auld 2008). Because Canada is 
too small to influence either the world market price of ethanol, corn or oil, the former tax 
exemption in Canada subsidized domestic fuel consumption (ethanol and gasoline). But the new 
Canadian biofuels producer credit program subsidizes biofuels production instead (and Canada 
has exported all domestic biodiesel production, taking advantage not only of the domestic 
production subsidy but also of both the high market price established by the EU tax exemption 
and the U.S. blender’s tax credit). Until the United States closed the ‘splash & dash’ loophole, 
Canada had therefore ‘triple dipped’: benefiting from its own biofuels producer tax credit 
(available only for domestic production), the U.S. blender’s tax credit (available to U.S. 
production and U.S. imports), and a high EU biodiesel price due to EU tax exemptions. 
Furthermore, Canada has now established a mandate; this will tax gasoline to pay for the higher 
price of ethanol established in world markets while domestic biofuels producers will be 
unaffected. 
 
3.   The welfare economics of ‘splash & dash’ 
 
The market effects of the U.S. ‘splash & dash’ program are shown in Figure 4. To keep the 
analysis tractable, we assume no transportation costs. The world price of biodiesel 
EU
B P is 
determined in the European Union by the tax exemption (see equation (4)). The price is assumed 
to be unaffected by changes in EU biodiesel imports due to U.S. policy.
17 Without loss of 
generality, the U.S. biodiesel supply curve
US S is assumed to be inclusive of foreign biodiesel 
import supply. 
 
If there was no ‘splash & dash’, a U.S. (and foreign) producer has to sell directly to either the 
U.S. or EU market. If biodiesel is blended with regular diesel in the United States, then the 
mixture has to be consumed domestically and cannot be exported to the European Union to take 
advantage of a higher market price generated by the EU tax exemption. Because biodiesel prices 
are higher in the European Union, one would expect all U.S. biodiesel production to be exported. 
Nonetheless, we observe domestic consumption of biodiesel in the United States. This is 
because, among other reasons, some U.S. states have their own biodiesel consumption mandates, 
there are huge variations in transportation costs for export, and a portion of domestic biodiesel 
production is also used directly in biodiesel transport. Therefore, in the 1
st panel of Figure 4, we 
model domestic demand for biodiesel in the United States.   9
 
At the prevailing world biodiesel price
EU
B P , the quantity Q
US- C
U S is exported to the European 
Union.
18 Total biodiesel supply in the European Union is the horizontal sum of the EU supply 
curve S
EU and the U.S. excess supply curve ES
US. At price
EU
B P , total quantity of biodiesel 
available in the EU market is Q
EU+M
EU, where M
EU denotes imports from the United States. 
 
Under the ‘splash & dash’ scenario, both domestic U.S. biodiesel and biodiesel imported into the 
United States is first blended with regular diesel to be eligible for the $1/gallon blender’s tax 
credit and then a portion is exported to the European Union. The U.S. biodiesel supply curve 
shifts down by the amount of the per unit blender’s tax credit tc. Because the world biodiesel 
price does not change, domestic U.S. biodiesel consumption remains unchanged and so all 
additional U.S. biodiesel production (and imports) due to the production subsidy effect of ‘splash 
& dash’ is exported. Total EU biodiesel supply is Q
EU+M
EU' but EU production of biodiesel and 
total EU consumption of biodiesel and diesel fuel is unaffected. 
 
The welfare effects of ‘splash & dash’ are depicted in Figure 5. To simplify the exposition, we 
assume there is no demand for biodiesel in the United States, i.e., all U.S. biodiesel production is 
exported to the European Union. Under the scenario of no ‘splash & dash’ program and free 
trade, the total quantity of biodiesel available in the EU market is 0
EU US Q Q + . 
  
Now, assume no ‘splash & dash’ program and U.S. biodiesel is excluded from the EU market 
(say due to a prohibitive tariff like the current EU tariff equal to about the U.S. tax credit of 
$1/gallon.). In this case, the EU biodiesel market price would have to increase to P1 to generate 
an equivalent level of EU biodiesel production to achieve EU biodiesel consumption prior to the 
prohibitive tariff (and without a U.S. tax credit). The EU tax exemption would have to increase 
and so EU taxpayers would have to pay area a+b in the 2
nd panel of Figure 5 to achieve the same 
level of consumption as with free trade and no U.S. policy. The current EU tax exemption is not 




On the other hand, a prohibitive tariff would cost U.S. taxpayers area g+h in the1
st panel of 
Figure 5 in order to raise biodiesel production from an autarky level (associated with price
US
A P ) 
to the free trade level.
20 Therefore, the sum of areas a+b and g+h in Figure 5 represents gains to 
both countries from U.S. - EU biodiesel trade without the U.S. tax credit. 
 
Suppose the United States provides a blender’s tax credit to achieve a desired level of biodiesel 
consumption (production and imports) or ‘mandate’ 1
US Q (yet to be enforced) where exports are 
not counted towards the mandate.
21,22 Up until October of 2008, all biodiesel (domestic and 
imported) was eligible for the U.S. tax credit provided pure biodiesel was blended with a ‘splash’ 
of diesel in the United States. For convenience, in Figure 5 the new U.S. biodiesel production 
with the blender’s tax credit in place exactly matches the production mandate. This has actually 
been the case in 2009 (where the U.S. mandate was not enforced through RINs, unlike U.S. 
ethanol). Assuming that all tax credit-induced biodiesel production in the United States 
( 1 0
US US Q Q − ) is exported, the total quantity of biodiesel available in the European Union   10
is 1
EU US Q Q + . With a blender’s tax credit in place, U.S. taxpayers lose area e+f, the U.S. and 
foreign biodiesel producers (except for EU producers) gain e, while EU taxpayers lose about 
twice that in the form of tax revenues foregone (because the EU tax exemption is about twice the 
U.S. blender’s tax credit). EU biodiesel producers and fuel consumers are unaffected. Moreover, 
the U.S ‘splash & dash’ program helps to achieve the EU renewable fuels target without taxing 
EU fuel consumers or taxpayers.
23 
 
On the other hand, in a hypothetical situation where biodiesel exports from the U.S. do count 
towards both mandates, then the question arises as to what are the welfare gains for both 
countries? The U.S. values its domestic mandate by( ) 1
EU US
B c P t Q + × . If all U.S. mandated 
biodiesel were exported to the European Union its societal value there would be ( ) 1 1
EU US US S Q Q × , 
where the first term represents the biodiesel price that would have to prevail on the EU market in 
order to generate production of  1
US Q gallons of biodiesel. Therefore, the total societal gains of 
counting the same biodiesel towards two mandates are( ) ( ) 1 1 1
EU US EU US US
B c P t Q S Q Q + × + × .  
 
If ‘splash & dash’ exports are eliminated by means of a prohibitive tariff, but European biodiesel 
consumption were to stay at  1
EU US Q Q + (i.e., the level associated with a ‘splash & dash’ scenario), 
then the EU tax exemption would have to increase to generate biodiesel price of P2, in order to 
achieve consumption levels with ‘splash & dash’. The EU taxpayers would have to spend 
a+b+c+d compared to the ‘splash & dash’ scenario. This would make the European Union 
worse off relative to a situation of allowing U.S. exports to count towards the target. Since area 
a+b represents gains to the European Union from biodiesel trade (with no biodiesel policy in the 
United States), area c+d must then be gains (i.e., saved EU fiscal loss) attributable to the U.S. 
‘splash & dash’ program. The total welfare gains associated with ‘splash & dash’ only are c+d–f. 
Because, in this situation, there is no trade in biodiesel, the total societal value of U.S. biodiesel 
is( ) 1
EU US
B c P t Q + × . 
 
4.   Empirical analysis of factors affecting EU biodiesel prices 
 
We now provide empirical evidence of the four major drivers of biodiesel market prices and 
hence EU industry profitability: oil prices, the EU fuel tax exemption, rapeseed prices, and 
market uncertainty. We show imports from the United States had little effect on EU market 
prices (if any). For availability reasons, data for Germany are used. The key indicator of lack of 
profitability is excess production capacity (Figure 2). Production capacity spiked in 2007 and 
excess capacity has been around 50 percent since. Construction of new production capacities, 
well beyond the point of actual biodiesel production, was initially incentivized by a system of 
generous biodiesel tax exemptions, low rapeseed oil prices, rising oil prices and so expectations 
of investors were very high about the long-run profitability of the sector. 
 
Biodiesel market prices in Germany closely follow the development of diesel (oil) prices. The 
latter started to soar in the second half of 2007, peaked in June 2008 and plummeted shortly 
afterwards. Currently, the diesel prices are at their pre-2007 levels (Figure 1). As biodiesel prices   11
started to decrease sharply after July 2008, profitability of EU biodiesel production deteriorated 
accordingly which is reflected in the high excess production capacity.  
 
The changes in the biodiesel tax exemption in Germany are positively correlated with 
profitability of the biodiesel sector. The German tax exemption started to decline in August of 
2006 and currently (as of September 2010) amounts to 0.29 Euro/liter – a drop of 0.18 Euro/liter 
relative to what it used to be prior to August of 2006 (Figure 1). The process of the tax 
exemption reduction is scheduled to end up in 2012 when the biodiesel excise tax will be on par 
with that of diesel (Biodiesel magazine 2009). 
 
Rapeseed oil is the predominant feedstock for biodiesel production in the European Union. The 
gap between biodiesel and rapeseed oil price narrowed significantly between July of 2007 and 
April of 2008, adversely affecting profitability of biodiesel production (Figure 6). This period 
also coincides with the peak in excess biodiesel production capacity in Germany (Figure 2). 
Therefore, soaring biodiesel imports from the United States, depicted in Figure 3, cannot be 
blamed as a major cause of low profits in the EU biodiesel sector. This is because the biodiesel 
price did not decline with imports. Interestingly, biodiesel prices show a positive and significant 
correlation with biodiesel imports from the United State (Figure 7). Busse et al. (2010) come to a 
similar conclusion, based on an econometric analysis: “while the subsidized U.S. B99 [‘splash & 
dash’] imports certainly reflect a challenge for German biodiesel producers, they appear not to 
have a negative impact on the price developments and integration in the EU market.” 
 
Uncertainty in the EU biodiesel market has been yet another factor of the sector’s problems. 
Huge production capacities were built up on the assumption that tax exemptions will not change. 
However, later the German government decided that these will be reduced gradually so as to 
finally level the playing field for regular diesel and biodiesel. Another example of uncertainty is 
an abrupt decrease in the announced overall biofuel mandate discussed below. 
 
Now that we have determined what factors have affected the development of the EU (German) 
biodiesel prices, we analyze which biofuel policy (tax exemption or blend mandate) have 
historically established the market prices in Germany. Figure 8 presents the difference between 
actual and predicted biodiesel price on the one hand and the difference between German and 
U.S. biodiesel price on the other. Relevant events happening in the biodiesel market between 
2005 and 2010 are labeled. Before the imposition of tariffs on U.S. biodiesel exports, the 
difference between the biodiesel market price in Germany and the United States was equal to 
transportation and transaction costs. They averaged 0.15 Euro/liter in the period of November 
2006 to June 2008.
24 After the tariff was imposed, this difference increased to 0.25 Euro/liter. 
Subtracting the former figure from the latter, we should approximately get the applied tariff rate. 
However, the difference of 0.10 Euro/per liter coincides with the simple average of the current 
anti-dumping tariffs of 0.11 Euro/liter (Official Journal of the European Union 2009a), but seems 
not to be reflecting the average countervailing duty of 0.19 Euro/l (Official Journal of the 
European Union 2009b). This perhaps can be explained by other countries increasing exports 
directly to the European Union, perhaps even Argentina which implicitly subsidizes biodiesel 
exports with differential export taxes. 
   12
Close examination of Figure 8 reveals which biofuel policy determined the biodiesel price in 
Germany. If the difference between actual observed market prices and predicted biodiesel prices 
(as per equation (4)) is around zero, then the market price is determined by the tax exemption. A 
positive difference indicates a binding mandate. As a biodiesel mandate was absent prior to 
2007, the biodiesel price must have been determined by a tax exemption. From 2007 to June 
2008, the difference between actual and predicted biodiesel prices oscillates around zero 
suggesting that a tax exemption is still binding (and the 4.4 percent blend mandate imposed in 
January 2007 is not a determining factor).  
 
Diesel prices plunged after July 2008 making the mandate bind. This is also supported by a 
significantly positive difference between actual and predicted biodiesel prices after July 2008. In 
2009 the biodiesel price was still determined by a mandate. But why did the tax exemption not 
bind again, given that diesel prices were comparable to those of the pre-2007 period? The reason 
is that since 2009, an ‘overall’ biofuel mandate is pursued.
25 As a result, the actual share of 
biodiesel has been higher than the specific biodiesel blend mandate. The rational for this comes 
from the fact that fuel distributors are free to choose which type of biofuel (ethanol or biodiesel) 
they use to fill the gap between the fuel specific mandates and the overall mandates. However, 
since the mineral oil industry prefers biodiesel over ethanol, the majority of the volume consists 
of biodiesel (USDA 2009). 
 
Our findings about which policy determines the biodiesel price in Germany can be cross-checked 
by comparing the observed shares of biodiesel with the blend mandate. The idea is that in the 
period when a tax exemption determines the price, the share of biodiesel should exceed the blend 
mandate. If a biodiesel specific mandate is binding, the actual biodiesel share should be close to 
the required blend. Finally, in the case that the overall mandate is binding, the actual biodiesel 
share is expected to exceed the specific mandate because of reasons explained in the previous 
paragraph. 
 
We test our findings on the data for January 2007 to May 2010.
26 The actual share of biodiesel in 
diesel fuel is presented in Figure 9.
27 Consistent with our hypothesis, the actual biodiesel share in 
the period of January 2007 to mid-2008 is well above the minimally required 4.4 energy percent. 
The only inconsistency of the theoretical predictions and actual data occurs in the second half of 
2008. Instead of fluctuating around the minimum biodiesel blend, the actual share is above it. We 
attribute this anomaly to market disequilibrium and expectations of market agents. In January 
2009 the share stabilizes and is driven by the overall mandate to which biodiesel contributes 
most.  
 
Figure 9 also documents the effects of a binding mandate. Prior to 2009, when no overall biofuel 
mandate was in place, the share of biofuels was mostly affected by the development in the 
biodiesel market. As soon as the overall binding mandate kicked in, the total share of biofuels 
stabilized at the level dictated by it. In Figure 9, we have superimposed the level of the originally 
announced (6.25 and 6.75 percent for 2009 and 2010, respectively) and the actual overall 
mandate in Germany (5.25 and 6.25 percent for 2009 and 2010, respectively). The actual 
biofuels share oscillates about the originally announced value in 2009 but shifts to the new blend 
level in 2010. This is a good illustration of the role of expectations in biofuel markets in 
Germany. The decision to reduce the blend came in October 2008 when all rapeseed was already   13
harvested and contracts for the next year signed. This explains why the market did not respond to 
the change of the policy. However, during 2009 all segments of the biodiesel production chain 
could adjust their production plans so as to comply with the new blend mandate. 
 
Finally, in Figure 10, we present a hypothetical situation under which there would be no U.S. 
biodiesel consumed in Germany over the period analyzed. The hypothetical share does not differ 
much from the actual share of biodiesel and from January of 2009 to present, the two are 
identical (due to insignificant imports from the U.S. relative to German domestic biodiesel 
consumption). This also suggests that the U.S. imports did not have a significant impact on the 
German biodiesel market.  
 
The Situation in the United States 
 
Both the U.S. and EU biodiesel sectors have faced the same challenges since 2007: excess 
production capacity and low profits. This coincides with the period of soaring biodiesel prices 
(Figure 1). The notable decrease in the world biodiesel price is reflected in the drop of biodiesel 
production and capacities in Germany (Figure 2) and the United States (Figure 11) in 2009 and 
2010, relative to 2008 (although the decrease in U.S. production capacity is not as apparent as it 
is in the European Union). Despite large domestic production capacity, the U.S. biodiesel 
producers/blenders did not fully take advantage of producing biodiesel domestically and then 
exporting it to the European Union. This became significant especially in 2008 when biodiesel 
exports were almost as high as domestic production, but a considerable share of exports was 
biodiesel from outside the United States that benefited from ‘splash & dash’. In 2009 and 2010, 
the volume of exported biodiesel is smaller relative to 2008, yet represents a significant portion 
of domestic production. It is because in 2009 and most of 2010 the U.S. biodiesel consumption 
mandate is has not been enforced and so producers have sold biodiesel abroad at higher prices. 
 
So what has happened after the EU import tariff was imposed? First, imports of biodiesel to the 
United States have plunged as importers are not allowed any longer to import and re-export 
biodiesel through the United States because they cannot claim a tax credit in this situation. 
Second, U.S. biodiesel exports have decreased significantly to the EU market because of the 
import tariff that reduces profits (Figure 12). However, even after 19 months since the imposition 
of the EU biodiesel tariffs, we have not seen a significant increase in profitability, production 
and biodiesel market prices in the European Union. This poses a question whether the ‘splash & 
dash’ program was indeed that harmful as claimed by the EU biodiesel sector. As long as a tax 
exemption is binding (i.e., determining the world price), then U.S. imports cannot have a 
negative impact on EU prices unless the change in exports affects world oil prices. This might be 
possible only if the biodiesel price were determined by a binding mandate; in this case biodiesel 
imports could lower the price premium of the mandate compared to that if only the tax 
exemption was binding. However, this biodiesel price premium above that if the biodiesel price 
was determined by the tax exemption may have been quite low. Besides, as we have shown, the 
German biodiesel mandate started to bind only after the peak of ‘splash & dash’ imports. 
 
As of January 1, 2010, the U.S. biodiesel blender’s tax credit has expired which is reflected in a 
noticeable drop of U.S. biodiesel production in January 2010 (Figure 12). This drop was caused 
by an instantaneous plunge in U.S. producers’ prices that have been equal to the sum of the U.S.   14
biodiesel market price (U.S. Gulf) and the $1/gallon blender’s tax credit (Figure 13). U.S. 
biodiesel producers now receive only the market biodiesel price which is still significantly higher 
than the predicted price. This reflects that world market prices are still influencing the U.S. 
market. There is no evidence the U.S. mandate is binding yet. It is because the U.S. market price 
is still possibly linked to the EU price through U.S. trade in biodiesel with other countries (e.g., 
Canada). 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
In response to the U.S. ‘splash & dash’ policy, the European Union imposed anti-dumping and 
countervailing import tariffs on biodiesel originating in the United States. The countervailing 
duty is about equal to the value of the U.S. blender’s tax credit. Although both a tax credit and a 
tax exemption are biodiesel consumption subsidies by itself (in a closed economy world), it is 
true a U.S. blender’s tax credit subsidizes world (including EU) biodiesel production if the tax 
exemption determines world prices. Had both countries had a tax exemption or a blender’s tax 
credit, then the issue of a biodiesel production subsidy would not have arisen.  
 
We conclude the controversy over the U.S. ‘splash & dash’ policy is much ado about nothing. 
The only way it could have affected the EU biodiesel price is if the change in U.S. exports due to 
the tax credit reduced world prices. This is implausible. The only other way is that U.S. exports 
could have reduced the price premium in the European Union due to a binding mandate. But the 
mandate was not made to bind in the European Union for much of the time period under 
investigation. This argument was not made in the investigation that established tariffs and this 
premium may have been quite small. 
 
In 19 months after the imposition of the EU countervailing duties (ranging from 211 to 237 
Euro/tonne, corresponding to 0.91 to 1.02 $/gallon) on U.S. biodiesel imports, we have not seen 
a significant increase in profitability, production and market prices in the European Union. This 
casts doubts on the claims of the European Biodiesel Board that the U.S. blender’s tax credit 
with “splash & dash’? and accompanying surge in EU biodiesel imports causes reduced 
profitability for EU biodiesel producers by “driving down market prices and forcing EU 
producers to shut down production” (Dow Jones 2009) 
 
The program could have been beneficial for EU taxpayers, fuel consumers as well as biodiesel 
producers in the United States. However, the U.S. taxpayer was worse off as blender’s tax credit 
has cost billions of dollars.
28 In the meantime, the EU’s tax exemption increased the (world) 
biodiesel market price above the price of oil-based diesel by almost the full amount of the 
exemption, benefiting biodiesel producers worldwide.
29   
 
We provide empirical evidence that the most important factors affecting reduced EU biodiesel 
production profitability were reduced world oil prices, decreasing EU tax exemptions, increasing 
rapeseed oil prices and market uncertainty. 
 
To put our findings into perspective, note that the share of rapeseeds in Germany in total arable 
area was 12.3 percent in 2009 (based on data from Eurostat). Most of domestic rapeseeds were 
used for biodiesel production (together with imports from other EU countries). This considerable   15
share of rapeseeds in Germany (and EU) just highlights another benefit of the ‘splash & dash’ 
program for the European Union: using foreign biodiesel (at the same price as domestic) leads to 
weaker competition for land which in turn alleviates the possible upward pressures on food 
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1 After July 2008, the mandate in Germany is binding and with the tariff in March 2009, therefore EU continues to 
set the world biodiesel price. 
 
2 This subsidy is not ‘specific’ to the United States as imports are eligible (including from the European Union) so 
one would not expect the U.S. tax credit to be ‘actionable’ in the WTO by other countries. 
 
3 See Kliauga, de Gorter and Just (2008; 2010) for an explanation. The only way it could benefit EU biodiesel 
producers is if the increased consumption of fuel due to the biodiesel tax exemption would have increased the world 
oil price, which is highly unlikely. 
 
4 Germany is used as a proxy for the European Union because it is Europe’s largest biodiesel producer, with a share 
of 28–55 percent in total European biodiesel production in the period 2002–2009. Moreover, we were able to find 
publically available data on biodiesel prices only for Germany.  
 
5 The reported biodiesel production capacities in Germany (Figure 2) and the United States (Figure 11) are 
underestimates of their true values as they only represent production capacities of the members of the European 
Biodiesel Board and the National Biodiesel Board, respectively. 
 
6 See Carriquiry and Babcock (2008). 
 
7 EU biodiesel was also eligible for ‘splash & dash’ and some did benefit from the program (Biodiesel magazine 
2007, Carriquiry and Babcock 2008). There are at least two other pieces of evidence that at least some EU 
production was exported to the United States to be mixed with a ‘splash’ of  diesel and then re-exported back to the 
European Union. First, the United States International Trade Commission reports imports of biodiesel from the EU 
in the period when the ‘splash & dash’ trade occurred. Second, FAS of USDA in its 2007 GAIN Report informed 
that a German biodiesel producer (Campa AG) because of market conditions found it more profitable to export the 
rapeseed oil to the U.S. and import biodiesel which benefits from the U.S. blenders credit rather than produce 
biodiesel from rapeseed oil in their own plant. 
 
8 The tariff was imposed even though U.S. Congress disallowed U.S. imports to be re-exported by making only 
biodiesel produced in the U.S. eligible ‘splah & dash’.. The European Union still went ahead with its anti-dumping 
proceedings as 90 percent of the volume of biodiesel entering the EU market was produced in the United States. 
(EBB, 2008). The U.S. blender’s tax credits for biodiesel expired at the end of 2009 and are yet to be extended, with 
some in the industry not only hoping for an extension of the tax credit but also for retroactive payments (Farm 
Futures, 2010). 
 
9 The federal tax credit in the United States up to December 2009 was $1/gallon. In Germany, up to July 2006, the 
biodiesel tax exemption was 0.4704 Euro/liter. A new rate of 0.3994 Euro/liter was in place until December 2007, 
followed by 0.3364 Euro/liter until the end of 2008. In 2009 the tax exemption was lowered to 0.2604 Euro/liter. 
However, in October 2009 the German Bundestag retroactively increased the tax exemption as of January 1, 2009, 
so that now it is 0.2875 Euro/liter. 
 
10 The only instance when the U.S. biodiesel prices dropped significantly relative to the EU prices was in November 
and December of 2008. At that time, the ‘splash & dash’ eligibility for imports into the United States only was 
closed i.e., re-exported biodiesel could not benefit from the tax credit. 
 
11 Were that the case, then the EU vehicle fleet would gradually consist of more gasoline-run vehicles. This would 
reduce the demand for diesel, thus possibly decreasing the diesel market price which, in turn, would lower the 
biodiesel price even more. Note that in the United States, diesel does not obtain preferential tax treatment vis-à-vis 
gasoline. 
 
12 Data sources for these calculations are provided in the appendix.   35
                                                                                                                                                             
 
13 Despite this finding, some economists (e.g., Birur, Hertel and Tyner 2009) argue that price premiums due to the 
additive value of ethanol are “additive” with the tax credit. 
 
14 The biodiesel prices are delinked completely under a consumption mandate and partially under a blend mandate. 
 
15 This is analogous to the argument by de Gorter and Just (2008; 2009a,b) that a tax credit is not additive with a 
biofuel price premium due to a mandate: only one policy instrument directly determines the gap between the biofuel 
and the oil-based gasoline/diesel price. 
 
16 Although the purpose of the U.S. blender’s tax credit is to raise the price of biodiesel in the United States, we 
show it does not – it only expands production and exports. 
 
17 Although the EU production was eligible for U.S. blender’s tax credit (and some EU production was exported to 
the United States and shipped back – see footnote 7), we do not model this as U.S. biodiesel prices averaged 
$1.30/gallon below EU prices over the time period 2007-2009 and so two-way transportation costs are on average 
not enough for EU producers to take advantage of $1/gallon (there were windows of opportunity, however, as the 
standard deviation of EU-U.S. price differences was $0.49/gallon). Note however that it did pay for substantial 
amount of U.S. imports from countries like Malaysia to be re-exported to Europe.  
 
18 Note that in the no-splash & dash scenario, the supply curve in the left panel of Figure 1 denotes supply of U.S. 
biodiesel only. This happens because of both a higher biodiesel market price and a higher tax exemption in the 
European Union. Therefore, non-U.S. biodiesel producers have no incentive to export to the United States. 
 
19 Another option for the European Union would be to enforce the mandate, which Germany is now doing. 
 
20 In the case of no international trade, the biodiesel market price in the U.S. would be determined independently 
from the European Union according to equation (4), however in this case by a blender’s tax credit (unlike the 
European Union where it is determined by a tax exemption). Based on our calculations, in the period 2007 to 2008 
the autarky biodiesel price would average $3.05/gallon, while in Europe it was $4.45/gallon in the same period. 
 
21 U.S. biodiesel mandate was introduced by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. Originally it was 
scheduled to apply since 2009 but due to lack of enforcement by the Environmental Protection Agency, it 
supposedly is being enforced beginning July 2010 but data on biodiesel prices indicate otherwise, perhaps because 
of ongoing lawsuits. 
 
22 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in personal correspondence argues that “exported biodiesel 
(unblended or blended) is subtracted by requiring that the equivalent number of Renewable Identification Numbers 
(RINs) be retired”. The office of Mr. Larry Schafer of the National Biodiesel Board has also confirmed that U.S. 
biodiesel exports are not counted towards the U.S. biodiesel mandate.  
 
23 The imposition of import tariffs by the European Union hurts U.S. (and third countries) biodiesel producers but 
U.S. taxpayers gain. Meanwhile, the EU renewable fuels target becomes more difficult to achieve without biodiesel 
imports. The high opportunity cost for food and feedstocks used in biodiesel production means the intercept of both 
the U.S. and EU biodiesel supply curves are above world oil prices. This causes ‘rectangular’ deadweight costs in 
addition to traditional deadweight cost triangles (de Gorter and Just 2008; 2009b). A ‘splash & dash program’ can 
contribute to reducing these deadweight costs, albeit, in this situation, at the expense of U.S. taxpayers (but the EU 
can achieve their target at less cost and so should encourage ‘splash & dash’, especially given the fact that EU 
biodiesel market price is unaffected by the ‘splash & dash’ scheme, provided the price premium is not determined 
by the mandate).  
 
24 Over the entire pre-tariff period the transaction costs averaged 0.22 Euro/liter. However, between July 2008 and 
imposition of provisional tariffs the U.S. market seems to have been in disequilibrium and so we have considered 
only the period of November 2006 to June 2008.   36
                                                                                                                                                             
  
25 The overall biofuel blend mandate is defined as the share of energy from all biofuels (ethanol and biodiesel) in 
total fuel (gasoline and diesel) energy. 
 
26 This is the period for which UFOP (Union for Promoting Oil and Protein Plants) provides relevant information to 
compute energy shares of biofuels in all transportation fuels. 
 
27 This share was calculated as (pure biodiesel + biodiesel for blend + pure vegetable oil)/(pure biodiesel + biodiesel 
for blend + pure vegetable oil + diesel); where the volumes were adjusted for the energy content of individual fuels. 
 
28 The U.S. biodiesel tax credit is projected to cost taxpayers about $2.28 billion between January of 2007 and 
December of 2009 (calculated as the sum of U.S. domestic biodiesel production in 2007-2009 and U.S. biodiesel 
imports in the period January 2007 to October 2008). The respective number of gallons was then multiplied by $1).  
At least $608 million of this amount was awarded to foreign-produced biodiesel. 
 
29 For ease of reference we talk about the EU tax exemption policy. However, transport fuels taxation is still a 
responsibility of individual EU member states, although the European Union has set out some framework rules and 
regulations that the member states must follow. 
 